

1. *Bo/Kamer*

*Attached is  
copy of OSI comments  
on GCB paper.*

2. *~~B~~ Kathy - file*

*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: 9 March 1960

STAT

FROM : T. A. Parrott

SUBJECT: Semi-Final Draft of "Public Information Guidelines for the Pacific Missile Range"

The working group will discuss the attached draft at a meeting scheduled for Monday, 14 March. May we have your comments by noon Friday, 11 March?

Attachment: Subject Draft, 2 copies

*4/15/60 NC*  
*12/1/60 attached*

*OSI comments  
fwd to BA/OEB -  
11 Mar 60*

TOP BOTTOM

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

FE

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	INITIALS	DATE
1	ONE (104 Admin)	no comment.	
2	O/DD/I (344 Admin)	1/17	
3			
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<input type="checkbox"/>	ACTION	<input type="checkbox"/>	DIRECT REPLY	<input type="checkbox"/>	PREPARE REPLY
<input type="checkbox"/>	APPROVAL	<input type="checkbox"/>	DISPATCH	<input type="checkbox"/>	RECOMMENDATION
XX	COMMENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	FILE	XX	RETURN
<input type="checkbox"/>	CONCURRENCE	<input type="checkbox"/>	INFORMATION	<input type="checkbox"/>	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

May we please have your comments  
(orig. & 2) on the attached OCB Semi-Final  
Draft of "Public Information Guidelines for  
the Pacific Missile Range" by 1000, Friday,  
11 March 1960.

Instructions are attached.

OSI will also be requested to comment.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.

DATE

O/DD/I

STAT  
9 Mar 60

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**MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence**

**SUBJECT: Comments on OCB Draft Paper**

**REFERENCE: Semifinal Draft of Public Information Guide  
Lines for the Pacific Missile Range**

1. The following comments are furnished as requested on Reference.
2. With reference to those sections of the policy guidance paper indicating that the release of information should be kept to a minimum, e.g., A4a, B6 and particularly B6c, there is full agreement. However, it must be anticipated that the Soviets will have nominal knowledge of U.S. activities in the Pacific, and if they believe it politically expedient, may release false or misleading propaganda. In particular, this might be expected in case of accidents or untoward events. The above contingency probably should receive some recognition in Sections A, B and C.
3. It appears that some mention should be made in the paper, including guidance thereon, as to what the U.S. action should be if the Soviets move intelligence collection sources, e.g., SIBIR ships, into or close to the impact area.

STAT

**HERBERT SCOVILLE, JR.**  
**Assistant Director**  
**Scientific Intelligence**

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OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD  
Washington 25, D. C.

March 8, 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE BOARD ASSISTANTS,  
OCB WORKING GROUP ON NUCLEAR ENERGY, AND  
CERTAIN MEMBERS OF OCB WORKING GROUP ON  
OUTER SPACE

SUBJECT: Semi-Final Draft of "Public Information Guidelines for the  
Pacific Missile Range"

The enclosed is furnished to you for review and comment prior to its consideration at a meeting of the combined Working Groups, referred to above, to be held Monday, March 14, 1960, at 10 a.m., in Room 361, Executive Office Building.

This paper is tentatively scheduled for the Board Assistants' Meeting March 25, and for the OCB Meeting April 6.



Ridgway B. Knight  
Deputy Executive Officer

Enclosure:

Subj. semi-final draft,  
dtd 3/8/60.

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Semi-Final DRAFT

3/8/60

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PUBLIC INFORMATION GUIDELINES FOR THE PACIFIC  
MISSILE RANGE

A. INTRODUCTION

1. The establishment of an extensive missile range complex in the Pacific involves public relations problems of consequence to the U. S. and the conduct of its foreign policy. The Pacific Missile Range includes several separate ranges, but the ones extending furthest from the U. S. mainland are most likely to produce potential problems. These are: (a) an ICBM range extending from the U. S. West Coast to impact areas near Wake, Midway, and Eniwetok Islands; (b) an anti-ICBM range in the vicinity of Kwajalein and Johnston Islands.

2. Public relations problems which may arise in the operation of the range include: (a) the possibility that certain firings as well as missile landings may take place near populated areas, part of which include U. S. Trust Territory; (b) the possibility that firings may disrupt commercial fishing or present hazard to aircraft and ships. In addition, local sensibilities must be considered in the operation of the PMR. The Japanese, due to their war experience and previous nuclear weapons testing in this general area, have developed an abhorrence of any military weapons development program which from their point of view in any way poses a threat in the Pacific area. This was manifest during the series of Soviet missile tests in the Central Pacific in January 1960.

3. The above points apply only to military missile activities. Maximum publicity, on the other hand, would be desirable for any peaceful, purely scientific space activities which may be carried on at the PMR. Ways should be sought, in coordination with appropriate agencies, to arrange maximum exploitation for such material in overseas areas but in ways which would prevent, to the extent possible, identification of such activities with the phrase "Pacific Missile Range." Any statements on scientific space activities would, of course, follow the guidelines set forth in the "OCB Public Information Policy on U. S. Space Activities", dated December 16, 1958.

4. In view of this, it is particularly important that:

a. In general, public information activities concerning the PMR and its operations, particularly routine military firings such as ICBM training shots, should be kept to a minimum in overseas areas and especially Far Eastern countries. In Japan, whose former territories and present

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fishing interests are close to the impact area, public opinion is especially sensitive. However, specific firings which would add measurably to U.S. prestige--such as accurate or distance shots and the like--should be viewed as exceptions to this general rule.

b. Understanding by governments in the area of the need for the PMR and its operations, including knowledge of safety precautions, should be maximized so they will be prepared to reassure the people of their countries with appropriate public statements in case of untoward events.

#### B. GUIDANCE

5. Pursuant to the purposes stated above, the following guidelines will govern information activity in connection with the PMR: Except in unusual cases, public releases or statements will be kept to a minimum necessary to inform or reassure residents of the U.S. In framing such releases as are deemed necessary, special consideration will be given to its potential effect outside the continental U.S., especially in the Far East, so as to reduce adverse reaction which may damage our interests in Far Eastern countries.

6. Selection of points for inclusion in releases or statements should normally be limited to the following:

a. High standards of safety have been instituted in the range's operation. (See Reference Information)

b. The use of the range presents no hazards for all intents and purposes to aircraft, shipping, fishing or other commercial enterprises.

c. In all cases full and careful consideration will be given to the choice of areas flown over or impacted in to ensure that no hazards will result.

d. The U.S. operations in the range are intended to contribute to the Free World's security, and to the advancement of science.

e. As concerns references to the use of live warheads, such references should be avoided whenever possible. In such instances, when reference is essential in releases, statements, etc., it must be made so as to reflect existing national policy on the testing of nuclear weapons.

7. Confidential briefings of overseas governments, particularly in Far East countries lying nearest the impact areas, should be performed

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as soon as possible. The aim should be to attain maximum understanding by governments of the need for the PMR and its operations, including safety precautions. Explanations of the need for the PMR should normally be based, unless local factors dictate otherwise, on point 6. d. above. Reference might be made to Soviet missile testing in the Pacific area as pointing up the Free World's need for such a range.

8. In order to make possible the prompt fulfilment of this instruction, U.S. missions, consulates, and military commands in foreign countries or trust territories concerned with PMR operations should be kept informed, as far in advance as possible, by the departments and agencies concerned of scheduled projects, the nature of projects, impact areas involved and safety precautions instituted for the program of the PMR. In particular, they should be advised in advance of first tests of a new and major character. This is to avoid one of the major sources of adverse reaction, uninformed speculation and misconceptions contrary to the actual facts.

#### C. IMPLEMENTATION OF GUIDANCE

9. Any public releases or statements on the PMR will be coordinated with appropriate agencies. Each contemplated release or statement will be carefully examined to ensure that overseas public relations problems have received attention and that the above guidance points as far as practical have been observed.

10. The timing of public information about PMR operations should more properly place emphasis on operations taking place or scheduled to take place in the near future rather than on ultimate operations contemplated for periods further in the future.

11. Public releases or statements will, where appropriate, include any or all of the following points: A description of the area of the range; safety measures being taken, to include notices to airmen and mariners, surveillance of critical areas prior to firing, and the scheduling to avoid, insofar as possible, disruption of customary air and sea traffic and fishing activity.

#### D. BACKGROUND

12. The Pacific Missile Range was established in January, 1958, with Headquarters at the U.S. Naval Missile Center, Point Mugu, California.

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13. The Navy is the executive agent for the range and is assigned management control, range operation and safety--plus the responsibility for range development. In addition to these responsibilities, the Navy provides range support for Air Force ballistic missile training--grants access to the Army and Air Force to use range facilities and plans range capability for satellite operations.

14. The Pacific Missile Range is the largest of the three national missile ranges, the others being the Atlantic Missile Range and the White Sands Missile Range. The Atlantic Range is operated by the Air Force and has as its mission the research and development firings of long-range guided missiles and space vehicles of the three Armed services. The White Sands Range is under control of the Army and is used for research and development firings of short range air-to-air, surface-to-surface and surface-to-air guided missiles.

15. The Pacific Missile Range does not duplicate either the Cape Canaveral or White Sands installations. Rather it complements these ranges, offering facilities not available at other sites such as providing a large launch area on the West Coast for training and satellite firings in the polar orbit.

16. Its mission is to provide range support to the Department of Defense and the other designated Government agencies for launching, tracking and collecting data in guided missile, satellite and space vehicle research<sup>and</sup>/development, evaluation and training programs; to conduct tests and evaluation of naval guided missile weapon systems and their components; and to provide supporting base services.

17. The main satellite firing facility of the Pacific Missile Range is the U.S. Naval Missile Facility, Point Arguello, 90 miles north of Point Mugu. This Facility will provide all facilities for the programs assigned to the Range.

18. When completely operational, the Range will provide ample room and adequate instrumentation for ground or flight testing or guided missiles of any type--short, intermediate, or long range; ballistic or non-ballistic; air-launched, surface or ship-launched, or underwater launched. Facilities of the Range will include launching pads, tracking and data-recording equipment, test communications network, laboratories, storage facilities, etc.

19. The Pacific Missile Range consists in total of the following various sections:

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- a. An inland range not considered pertinent to this paper.
- b. A sea test range which utilizes the near waters of the West Coast, and extends 500 miles paralleling the California coast from Los Angeles to north of San Francisco and extends 250 miles seaward.
- c. An IRBM Range which utilizes Pacific Ocean areas along the West Coast west and northwest as far as the Hawaiian Islands.
- d. An ICBM Range which utilizes an area extending from the West Coast westward to the area of Wake, Midway and Eniwetok Islands.
- e. A Nike Zeus AICBM Range which will utilize areas in and around Kwajalein and Johnston Islands.

20. In addition to the above, there is a satellite polar orbit range now in operation, and consideration is being given to the possible establishment of an equatorial range. These latter two ranges, however, present different types of problems than those set forth in this paper, which is primarily concerned with missile activities.

Attachment:

ANNEX - Guidelines on Soviet  
Missile Activities in the Pacific  
(to be furnished separately)

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REFERENCE MATERIAL

To be made available as needed consists of:

Safety features of PMR, Safety Record of AMR, General Firing Schedule PMR. For other material pertinent to the problem discussed in this guidance see:

- a. Department of State Circular 1121, dated March 18, 1959.
- b. Department of State Telegram 1851, dated May 22, 1959, to Amembassy Tokyo.
- c. Department of State Telegram 1872, dated June 3, 1959, to Amembassy Tokyo.
- d. Emtel 2696 to Amembassy Tokyo.
- e. Department of Defense release dated November 25, 1958, subject: Procedure for News Coverage of Firings into Pacific Missile Range which are open to the press.

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